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Case No. 20080576-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Larry Douglas Dunn, Jr.,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for eleven counts of theft by deception, a
second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did Defendant's inability to perform his part of the plea bargain before
sentencing entitle him to withdraw his guilty plea?
Standard of Review. This Court will "review a trial court's denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating the
clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction
with that decision." State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ^ 7, 95 P.3d 1203 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212,1f 7, 73 P.3d 985).

2. Defendant's claim that the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea
without an adequate factual basis is presented for the first time on appeal, and
Defendant does not assert or establish plain error. Can he prevail?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue.
3.

Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion by running three of

Defendant's eleven prison terms consecutively?
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's sentencing decision for
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, *{ 14,82 P.3d 1167.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004):
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004):
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of
the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with eleven counts of theft by
deception, a second degree felony. R. 1-4 (addendum A).
Plea hearing. A change of plea hearing was held in May 2007. R. 104
(addendum B). Defendant's counsel set forth the plea bargain as memorialized in a

Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea. R. 31-41 (addendum C).
Defendant pled guilty to all 11 counts and waived his right to be sentenced in 45
days. R. 36; 104: 2. He agreed to deposit $1.3 million in his counsel's trust account
before sentencing in 90 days. Id. "And this money will be paid to the victim
Richard Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously
transferred to Mr. Dunn during the years of 2004 and 2005. And they are the monies
subject to the 11 counts in the present case." R. 104: 2; see also R. 36. The State
agreed that "once it has verified that Mr. Waters has received the 1.3 million in legal
funds, it will stipulate to the defendant withdrawing his pleas to the 11 counts and
the present case will be dismissed." R. 104: 2-3; see also R. 36. No provision was
made for the possibility that Defendant might not perform. See R. 36; 104.
Defendant was in prison on a bad check offense at the time of the plea. R.
104: 3. Defense counsel represented that Defendant "had a parole date last week."
R. 104: 3. He added that "[t]he Board should release him based upon this
agreement. The state has also agreed to write a letter to the Board recommending
that he be released for this time period so he can get these monies together." R. 104:
3; see also R. 36. The court emphasized to Defendant that it had no control over the
case on which he was incarcerated. Id. Defendant responded, "Absolutely." R.
104: 4.
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The court explained to Defendant that he would be pleading to eleven counts
of theft by deception, a second degree felony, in that he obtained or exercised
unauthorized control over the property or services of another by deception with the
purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that the property or services exceeded
$5,000 in value. R. 104: 6-7. The counts were the same except for the dates. See R.
104: 6-7.
The court invited the prosecutor to give the factual basis for the pleas. R. 104:
8. The prosecutor stated that "Mr. Richard Waters transferred monies from [Cache
County] to accounts under the control of [Defendant]. Each one of these transfers
was in excess of $5,000." R. 104: 8. The "monies were transferred for a specific
purpose/ 7 but Defendant used them "inconsistent to the purpose that they were
given to [Defendant] for." Id. This misuse of the money, the prosecutor noted,
"shows an intent to permanently deprive — there were several demands made." R.
104: 9. And Mr. Waters was in fact deprived of the money. Id.
Defense counsel stated that he did not think that Defendant would agree to
this rendition, but that he was "pleading guilty to get out of jail. The reason he
couldn't get the money back once the demand was made was . . . his probation got
violated down in Salt Lake County and he got incarcerated so he wasn't able to
access the money." R. 104:9-10. Consequently, the plea was structured as an Alford

4

plea. R. 104:9-10.l The court explained to Defendant the meaning of an Alford plea:
"That is where, after consultation with your attorney, you have determined that it is
in your best interest to accept the plea bargain... because you think if you went to
trial your chances of being convicted are such that you're better off to take this
plea/7 R. 104:10.
August status conference. A status conference was held on 20 August 2007,
three months after the plea hearing. R. 105. Defense counsel reported to the court
that Defendant "went before the Board on the 12th of August and he's waiting to
hear back." Id. The court asked Defendant if he anticipated being released soon.
Id. "I do," he replied. Id. "It's not your fault, it's the prison. . . . I missed the
original parole date. Unfortunately it's a bureaucracy, extremely slow." Id. He
stated that he "saw them on the 12th of July," and added, "I'll probably hear back by
the end of August and hopefully be released the first of September. Not maybe the
1st, but the first week or so of September." Id. The court gave the Defendant
another 90 days to come up with the money, continuing the matter until 19
November 2007. R. 105: 2-3.
The bench warrant After two more continuances, a status conference was
held on 3 December 2007, seven months after the plea hearing. R. 47, 50, 53.

1

The plea takes its name from North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
5

Defendant failed to appear and had paid no restitution to date. R. 53-54. A bench
warrant issued for his arrest. R. 54-56. Defendant bonded out of jail. R. 64.
Sentencing was scheduled for 14 January 2008. R. 64, 67.
January hearing. A hearing was held on 14 January 2008, eight months after
the plea hearing. R. 45-46; 106 (addendum D). Defendant was still in prison; his
counsel requested an additional 60 days. R. 106: 2. He explained, "The whole
premise of this case was that he would — once he's released from prison without
someone monitoring him, as far as restricting his phone call access, he'd be able to
make arrangements to come up with the restitution." Id. In which case "the state
was willing to allow him to withdraw his plea." Id. Defendant "finally got paroled
into Day Reporting Center and also had some surgery." Id. But "now he's back in
prison." Id. He had a hearing set for January 23, "and he indicates that he may be
released from prison a couple of weeks after that." Id. Counsel requested more
time: "He just needs some more time, if the court is willing to grant him another 60
days. He can then come up with the money and the case can be resolved." Id.
The court responded, "You know, counsel, that's almost ludicrous. Based on
his representations in the past and his actions, now you want additional time." Id.
The victim, Richard Waters, was present, and the court sought input from his
counsel, Mr. Brown. Id. He responded, "My understanding is that [Defendant]
could basically give someone power of attorney to get the money. We don't want to
6

continue the case, but we're willing to continue the case if he's willing to give a
power of attorney to his lawyer to get the money." R. 106: 3. He added, "Mr.
Waters just wants his money back." Id. The court queried whether Brown had "any
hope at all of getting any of that based on what this man has done so far?" Id.
Brown responded, "Well, I know he has the money. It's up to him as to whether or
not he'll give it back." Id.
The court continued the matter until 11 February 2008, then addressed
Defendant directly: "Mr. Dunn, I can assure you that this court will do everything it
can to see that you serve out the balance of your life in prison based on what you've
done in the past." R. 106: 4. The court warned Defendant that he would run the
counts consecutive. Id. "If you don't want to serve out the balance of your life in
prison, then you better come up with that money by the 11th." Id.
"I can't, sir," replied Defendant. Id. Referring to the plea deal, he stated, "I
asked for 60 days to cover the 34 days to access the money, so that would give me
three weeks of the dominoes not falling properly. I was given another 30 days
beyond that by the prosecutor just because he felt like he wanted to make sure it
happened." R. 106: 5. He continued, "So far the deal was —that was 100 percent.
I've never been given one day." Id.
Defendant gave an unintelligible explanation of his prison time: "Moreover, I
was sent to prison for not doing a new crime [sic], but for the alleged possibility of
7

this crime here, which I— [the prosecutor] even admitted when we pled saying Mr.
Dunn has come up with an idea here and we can get this resolved/' Id. He also
spoke unintelligibly of the money he had agreed to repay: "Moreover, when that
money is deposited into my attorney's account then all the other monies I will have
access to the account." Id.
He threatened the victim with legal action: "Then I asked for the possibility of
going back and filing charges against Mr. Waters for having this happen to me
because it should not have happened to me." Id.
He addressed the delay: "I gave you ... guys the opportunity to hang me if I
didn't come through, but I haven't had one day. You're frustrated with me, saying
you've given me ample time. No. I've never once—there's not been any intercourse
betwixt me or the prison." Id.
He implied that some blame was due his father: "Then my father gets
involved and oh, gee." R. 106: 6. He later added, "Then my dad gets involved and
I'm sent to a halfway house where I'm monitored. I have a clotting problem, but I
can live on my own. I'm a grown man." R. 106: 7.
He cast himself as the victim: "I've already released — done everything. I gave
you guys the opportunity to hang me so I can show my innocence at the same time.
But I've not been given one day, sir, not even one hour outside of prison." R. 106: 6.

8

Defendant's tone may be inferred from the court's response: "Mr. Perry, after
all of that tirade, I'm not sure if your client wants to be sentenced today or would
like to take the deal to the 11th." R. 106: 7. After a few interjections from Defendant
and the prosecutor, the court interrupted: "That's enough. It appears to the court
that we're grasping at straws to get all or part of that $1.3 million and it's not
coming, Mr. Brown. This guy has lied from the day he was born up until now.
You've heard his spiel here today too." R. 106: 7-8.
Victim's counsel responded, "I've heard his spiel over and over, a lot more
than anybody in this room. If he's willing to give power of attorney to Mr. Perry,
that's the simple question I'd like him to answer today." R. 106: 8.
Defendant maintained that he was not the cause of the problem:
I've already said yes. And the deputy — supposedly, when we had our
pow wow last time, went and verified that the account cannot be
accessed without myself and Richard [Waters] there in person. So I'm
taking my own funds and putting them in over here so that Richard
gets his and then I'm expecting him to go over and release those still.
So I feel I've been in prison not for doing a new crime, but on the
alleged of this now for two years. And you say I'm causing problems.
How am I causing problems?
Id.
The court responded, "Let's give him the benefit of the doubt and continue it
to the 11th at nine. If you can get some money in—" "I can't," interjected

9

Defendant. "I told you what I needed, 34 days." Id. The court ruled, "The 11th,
9:00," but the last word was Defendant's: "Why?" Id.
Sentencing hearing. A sentencing hearing was finally held on 25 February
2008, nine months after the plea hearing. R. 107 (addendum E). Defense counsel
suggested that "this is a case that we ought to maybe have Mr. Dunn examined to
see if he's competent to proceed." R. 107:2. Defendant interjected, "Can I ask for an
attorney that would vigorously defend me? I deserve that whether I'm guilty or
not." Id.
Defense counsel also made an oral motion to withdraw the guilty plea,
suggesting that Defendant was incompetent to plead guilty. 107: 3. The court
responded, "The motion will need to be made in writing. You can do that at a later
time." Id.2 The court denied both motions as untimely, granted leave for Defendant
to file written motions at a later time, and proceeded to sentencing. R. 107: 4.
Counsel stated that Defendant had been unable to repay the $1.3 million
because he was unable to get out of prison and access his off shore trust:
Mr. Dunn entered into an agreement where he was hopeful that
he could get out of prison and get over to the Isle Mann [sic] where
he's indicated he has the one point three million dollars to pay Mr.
2

The court was mistaken on both counts. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea
need not be in writing. State v. Peterson, 2008 UT App 304, Tf 2,103 P.3d 639. And
the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw made after the
announcement of sentence. State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, % 20,114 P.3d 585.
10

Waters. He was unable to get out of prison and get access to these
funds in order to pay the restitution to Mr. Waters.
Because he's been unable to get out of prison to get access to this
money, he has not had the benefit of the bargain that was entered into
in this case. . . . Because of his inability to have access to this money
that's in the Isle Mann [sic], an off shore trust, because of his
incarceration status, he's been unable to make restitution.
R. 107: 4-5. Counsel acknowledged that "[t]he state wrote a letter and tried to help
him in that matter." R. 107:5. Counsel concluded, "I believe he has a Board date, or
maybe not." Id. Defendant responded: "The Board said I needed to figure out this
second thing, which I haven't got to talk to you about yet. Then go back and tell
them what happened. They're pending right now posing you a question, but I
haven't even spoken to my attorney." Id.
The prosecutor described Defendant as "a complete fraud" and submitted the
matter based on the Presentence Investigation Report:3
I think the report done by the AP&P agent, Mr. Feltenberger,
was excellent. I thought he did a great job of explaining what Mr.
Dunn is all about. Mr. Dunn is a complete fraud and he continues to
try to —even today it's continually a fraud. He's unlike many
defendants, or any defendant, frankly, I've ever prosecuted. I think
Mr. Feltenberger's recommendation is very appropriate. I ask the court
to sentence the defendant to prison. I'll submit it.

3

This report does not appear in the record on appeal.
11

R. 107: 6. Defendant made a rambling statement in which he asserted, "I haven't
done anything wrong yet/7 R. 107: 8. He later added, "Name one thing where I've
messed up." R. 107:10.
The court imposed a $16,500 fine, a $7,729.70 surcharge, restitution of
$1,149,175 plus interest, and eleven terms of one to fifteen years. R. 107:11; R. 86-88
(addendum F). The terms on counts 1 through 3 run consecutively to the terms on
counts 4 through 7, and the terms on counts 8 through 11 run consecutively to the
other counts. R. 107:11; R. 88.
Defendant timely appealed. Compare R. 90 with R. 92.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On eleven occasions from May 2004 through January 2006, Defendant
induced Richard Waters to transfer a total of over one million dollars to Defendant
for a specified purpose, but used the money for a different purpose. R. 104:8; R. 1-3.
Each payment exceeded $5,000. R. 104: 8. Defendant intended to, and in fact did,
permanently deprived Waters of the money. R. 104: 9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Defendant claims that the court erred by not allowing him to withdraw his
plea once it became apparent that "it was impossible for him to perform" on the
plea bargain. This claim fails because the prosecutor did not breach the plea
bargain. A defendant cannot use his own breach as a reason to withdraw his plea.
12

2. Defendant claims that the State failed to present an adequate factual basis
for his plea, and thus that the court erred in accepting it. This claim fails for two
reasons. First, it was not preserved in the trial court and Defendant does not argue
plain error on appeal. His claim is therefore not properly before this Court. Second,
Defendant cannot establish plain error in any event, because he cannot show harm.
In the plea withdrawal context, to establish harm a Defendant must assert that, but
for the claimed illegality, he would not have pled guilty. Defendant has never made
this assertion, and nothing in the record suggests it is the case.
3. Finally, Defendant claims that the trial court failed to consider all the
legally relevant sentencing factors and therefore abused its discretion when it
sentenced him on consecutive counts. First of all, the trial court did not run the
prison terms on all 11 counts consecutively. It ran three counts consecutively, and
the remaining eight counts concurrently with those three.
In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

The record

demonstrates the court's familiarity with all the statutory sentencing factors except
Defendant's rehabilitative needs. That factor was undoubtedly addressed in the
presentence investigation report. Because the PSI is not included in the record on
appeal, this Court will assume the regularity of proceedings below —that the trial
court reviewed the PSI and acted in light of the information contained in it.

13

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANTS INABILITY TO PERFORM HIS PART OF THE
PLEA BARGAIN BEFORE SENTENCING DID NOT ENTITLE
HIM TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA
Defendant claims that the court erred by not allowing him to withdraw his
plea once it became apparent that "it was impossible for him to perform" on the
plea bargain. Br. Aplt. at 12. Defendant "requests the court to allow him [to]
withdraw his plea or extend the timeframe so he can transfer the money back to Mr.
Waters." Id.
"A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004). "Though a legitimate prosecution promise does
not render a guilty plea legally involuntary, its fulfillment is a necessary predicate to
a conclusion of voluntariness when a plea 'rests in any significant degree' on it."
Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973) (citation omitted) (quoting
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971)). Accordingly, "when a plea rests in
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled."
Santobello v. New York 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).

14

In Santobello "the United States Supreme Court recognized for the first time
that some remedy is constitutionally required wJten tlie State reneges on a promise
that formed the basis for a plea agreement." State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021,1026 (Utah
App. 1996) (emphasis added). And "when a plea agreement is breached by the
prosecutor, the proper remedy is either specific performance of the plea agreement or
withdrawal of the guilty plea both at the discretion of the trial judge." State v. Smit,
2004 UT App 222, f 17, 95 P.3d 1203 (emphasis added).
Here, the State did not renege on a promise or breach a plea agreement. The
agreement specified that if Defendant repaid the money he stole from Waters, the
State would stipulate to Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea and dismiss the
charges. R. 104:2-3; R. 36. Defendant failed to fulfill the agreement because he was
in prison on a bad check offense. R. 104: 3. He frankly acknowledges that "The
defendant was unable to perform on the contract."

Br. Aplt. at 11. Because

Defendant did not repay the money, the State's duty to perform was never
triggered.
Defendant did not argue below, and does not argue on appeal, that the
prosecutor breached the plea agreement. Nor could he. At the plea hearing, the
parties clearly contemplated that Defendant would obtain his own release from
prison. In fact, defense counsel represented that Defendant "had a parole date last

15

week." R. 104: 3. Defense counsel acknowledged below that "[t]he state wrote a
letter and tried to help him in that matter/ 7 R. 107: 5.
Accordingly, although Defendant relies on the contract analogy here, Br. Aplt.
at 11, he, not the prosecutor, is the party in breach. He is therefore not entitled to
relief under Santobello and its progeny. 4
II.
DEFENDANTS CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY
ACCEPTING HIS GUILTY PLEA WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE
FACTUAL BASIS FAILS BECAUSE IT IS PRESENTED FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND DEFENDANT DOES NOT
ARGUE OR DEMONSTRATE PLAIN ERROR
Defendant claims that "the State failed to present a factual basis for all the
elements of the crime/' and that by accepting the plea the court "failed to strictly
comply with rule 11." Br. Aplt. at 12 (capitalization omitted). 5

4

Defendant does not rely on or even mention the contractual doctrine of
impossibility, nor does he claim that its requirements are satisfied on this record.
See Br. Aplt. at 10-12; see also State v. Chacon, 198 P.3d 749, 752 (Idaho App. 2008).
5

Strict compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is no
longer the standard governing the withdrawal of guilty pleas.
The statutory standard is found at Utah Code Ann. § 7743-6 (West 2004).
Before 2003, this statute allowed a defendant to withdraw a plea for "good cause/'
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West 2004), Historical and Statutory Notes. Utah
courts interpreted this good cause standard to include rule 11 violations. See, e.g.,
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); State v. Tamawiecki, 2000 UT App 186,5
P.3d 1222. The pre-2003 statutory standard was therefore distinct from the
constitutional standard, which did not depend on whether the trial court had strictly
complied with rule 11. See, e.g., State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993);
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1993). In Salazar, for example, the
16

Defendant's claim fails for two reasons.

First, it is unpreserved and

Defendant does not claim that the trial court committed plain error. And second,
Defendant cannot establish plain error, because any error was harmless.
a.

Defendant did not preserve this claim below and does not argue
plain error on appeal.
Defendant's claim that his guilty plea lacks a factual basis in the record is

unpreserved.
"Before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record must clearly show
that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a
ruling thereon." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892,894 n.2 (Utah 1988).
This preservation rule "is grounded in our adversarial system of justice, which looks

supreme court held that the knowing and voluntary standard sets forth a "more
limited" inquiry than that which is required by rule 11, and "a failure to comply
with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea" therefore "does not" render a plea
unknowing and involuntary. Id. at 992. See also Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, f 16,
173 P.3d 842.
However, in 2003, the Utah Legislature removed the "good cause" provision
from § 77-13-6 and replaced it with the constitutional standard. Under the current
statute, a plea can now be withdrawn "only upon leave of the court and a showing
that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. The
plain language of the 2003 amendment conforms the statutory standard to the
constitutional one.
This history is incidental to this case, however, because an adequate factual
basis is essential under the constitutional standard as well as the old strict
compliance standard: "a guilty plea . . . cannot be truly voluntary unless the
defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5 (1969) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S.
459, 466 (1969)).
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to the parties to zealously advocate their cause before an impartial fact finder/' State
v. King, 2006 UT 3, If 14,131 P.3d 202. "It is axiomatic in our adversary system that a
party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate
the issue in subsequent proceedings/' Bririkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587,589
(Utah App. 1990) (cited in King, 2006 UT 3, II 14). Thus, Utah courts "have
consistently held that a defendant who fails to preserve an objection at trial will not
be able to raise that objection on appeal unless he is able to demonstrate either plain
error or exceptional circumstances/' King, 2006 UT 3, H 13 (citations omitted).
To preserve an issue for appellate review, "the grounds for the objection must
be distinctly and specifically stated," State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah
1989), and made in a "fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon/' Doe v. Hafen,
772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682
P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984)). An appellant must put the trial court on notice of the
error and support his claim in the trial court with evidence or relevant authority.
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Hf 13,14, 95 P.3d 276; State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App
219, Iff 10-12,189 P.3d 85.
Dean illustrates this requirement. Dean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea in the trial court, stating that the plea was taken in violation of rule 11 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. at ^f 5. Dean did not specify the basis for the
alleged violation, alleging only that there were "'two significant departures' from
18

due process and equal protection, without further explanation." Id. On appeal,
Dean argued for the first time that the trial court had committed plain error by not
advising him of his right to a "speedy public trial before an impartial jury/' Id. at % 6.
The supreme court held that Dean's appellate claim was not properly
preserved: "Dean's motion to withdraw and the asserted grounds therefor failed to
put the trial court on notice of the alleged error. Dean did not sufficiently bring the
issue to the court's attention in his motion to withdraw, nor was it supported by
evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. at 114.
Defendant's factual basis claim is similarly unpreserved. Defendant did move
to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. At sentencing, defense counsel made
an oral motion to withdraw Defendant's guilty plea, implying that Defendant was
incompetent to plead guilty:
MR. PERRY: We object to proceeding with sentencing at this
time because in order for him to — once he's sentenced he's not able to
withdraw his plea. So we'd like to make a motion prior to sentencing
to see if the plea can be withdrawn. I want to supplement that by
having him examined by two examiners at the state hospital to see if he
was competent at the time he entered his plea.
R. 107: 3. This motion was probably sufficient to preserve an appellate claim that
Defendant was incompetent to plead guilty. However, Defendant does not assert
that claim on appeal. And the motion was made in the context of an ongoing
exchange concerning Defendant's complaint that he had "not had the benefit of the
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bargain that was entered into in this case/' R. 107:4. It therefore came close enough
to preserving Defendant's appellate argument for breach of the plea bargain,
discussed in Point I, that the State does not contest preservation of that claim.
But Defendant's motion to withdraw did not come close to preserving a claim
of error going to the adequacy of the plea's factual basis. Defendant never informed
the trial court that he believed the factual basis for the plea was inadequate. In fact,
he never mentioned, directly or indirectly, the factual basis for the plea. See R. 107:
3-4.
Like Dean's motion, then, Defendant's ''motion to withdraw and the asserted
grounds therefore failed to put the trial court on notice of the alleged error.
[Defendant] did not sufficiently bring the issue to the court's attention in his motion
to withdraw, nor was it supported by evidence or relevant legal authority." Dean,
2004 UT 63, \ 14. Accordingly, Defendant's appellate claim, like Dean's, "was not
properly preserved below." Id.
This does not necessarily conclude the analysis. An appellate court may
review an unpreserved issue if "the trial court committed plain error or the case
involves exceptional circumstances." Id. at \ 13. However, where an appellant
"does not argue that exceptional circumstances or plain error justifies review of the
issue, [the appellate court will] decline to consider it on appeal." State v. Pledger, 896
P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Moreover, a party seeking review of an unpreserved issue must "articulate the
justification for review in the party's opening brief," not the party's reply brief. State
v. Finder, 2005 UT15,1 45,114 P.3d 551 (citing Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, f 9,
17P.3dll22).
Here, defendant does not in his opening brief argue that exceptional
circumstances or plain error justifies review of his unpreserved factual basis claim.
See Br. Aplt. at 12-16. This Court will therefore decline to consider it. This does
conclude the analysis.
b.

In any event, the trial court did not commit plain error.
Even if Defendant's failure to preserve this claim and failure to argue any

exception to the preservation requirement did not conclude the analysis — even if
this Court were to reach the merits — the trial court did not commit plain error. To
establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: "(i) an error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 13,10 P.3d 346 (quoting
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). "If any one of these requirements is
not met, plain error is not established." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209.
Here, even assuming arguendo that the first two requirements of the plain
error doctrine are satisfied, the third is not. The record is bereft of any evidence of
21

harm. "[A] defendant seeking to establish harmful error in the context of a failed
attempt to withdraw a guilty plea must assert[ ] that but for the alleged error, he or
she would not have pled guilty/7 Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, % 15 (quoting
Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^f 22) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant here, like Diaz-Arevalo, "has not expressly asserted, below or on
appeal, that he would not have pleaded guilty" to eleven counts of theft by
deception if the factual basis for that charge "had been properly explained to him/'
Id. Nor can this Court infer such an assertion from the assertions Defendant does
advance. Nothing in Defendant's statements in the trial court or this Court would
support an inference that Defendant was induced to plead guilty by an inadequate
factual basis for his plea.
Because Defendant has not asserted, let alone demonstrated, that he would
not have pled guilty had the factual basis been, in his view, adequate, "he has not
established harmful error by the district court. Having failed to establish harmful
error, he has not established plain error, and in the absence of plain error [this
Court] will not disturb the district court's ruling below." Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App
219, If 17.
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III.
THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY RUNNING THREE OF DEFENDANT'S
ELEVEN PRISON TERMS CONSECUTIVELY
Defendant claims that the trial court failed to consider all the legally relevant
sentencing factors "and therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced the
Defendant to the Utah State Prison on consecutive counts/' Br. Aplt. at 19.6
Proceedings below. After two lengthy sentencing hearings, summarized
above in the Statement of the Case, the court imposed a fine, a surcharge, restitution,
and eleven prison terms of one to fifteen years. R. 107:11; R. 86-88. The terms on
counts 1 through 3 run consecutively to the terms on counts 4 through 7, and the
terms on counts 8 through 11 run consecutively to the other counts. R. 107:11; R. 88.
Thus, in effect, three counts run consecutively to each other, while each of the
remaining eight counts runs concurrently to one of those three.
Standard of review. The imposition of a sentence "rests entirely within the
discretion of the [trial] court, within the limits prescribed by law." State v. Peterson,
681 P.2d 1210,1219 (Utah 1984) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because trial courts are vested with "wide latitude and discretion in sentencing,"
6

Although Defendant's third point heading refers to "cruel and unusual
punishment," Br. Aplt. at 16 (capitalization omitted), the text of his brief refers to
neither the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution nor Article I,
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, the State will treat the issue as a
common law, rather than a constitutional, attack on his sentence.
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State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997), this Court will "review a trial
court's imposition of consecutive sentences for an abuse of discretion/7 State v.
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, H 63, 52 P.3d 1194 (citations omitted). "An abuse of
discretion results when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors' or if
the sentence imposed is 'clearly excessive/" State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234,1235
(Utah 1990) (citations omitted). The reviewing court may find an abuse of discretion
only if it concludes that "no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by
the trial court" State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,887 (Utah 1978). " '[T]he burden is on
[the defendant] to show that the trial court did not properly consider all the
factors/" Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432 at % 28, 82 P.3d 1167 (second alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 16,40 P.3d 626).
Because sentencing courts enjoy wide latitude in determining the appropriate
sentence, challenges to consecutive sentences rarely succeed. See, e.g., State v. Warby,
2009 UT App 6; State v. Johnson, 2008 UT App 279; State v. Jimenez, 2007 UT App 116,
158 P.3d 1128; State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511,153 P.3d 804; State v. Hall, 2006
UT App 88; State v. Lehman, 2004 UT App 404.
Sentencing considerations. A sentencing court has the discretion to impose
consecutive sentences when a defendant has been convicted of more than one felony
offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Subsection (2) of section 76-3401 requires the court to consider several enumerated factors:
24

In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of
the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
The statute no longer contains a presumption in favor of concurrent sentences. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), (4) (West 2004).7
The sentencing court is not required to make record findings on each of the
statutory sentencing factors; rather, when evidence of those factors appears on the
record, a reviewing court will assume that the trial court considered them. See State
v. Helms, 2002 UT12, If 11,40 R3d 626 ("[W]e will not assume that the trial court's
silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider the proper [sentencing]
factors as required by law/')
Record on appeal. "Parties claiming error below and seeking appellate review
have the duty and responsibility to support their allegations with an adequate
record. State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993). "Thus, the appellant has the
burden of providing the reviewing court with an adequate record on appeal to
prove his allegations/7 Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 R2d 1049,1052 (Utah App.
1990) (citing Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989)); accord State v.
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982). "[I]f an appellant fails to provide an
7

The version of this statute construed in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah
1998), the case upon which defendant primarily relies, contained a presumption in
favor of concurrent sentences. See Galli, 967 P.2d at 938.
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adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the
proceedings below/' State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, % 28,44 P.3d 690 (citation omitted).
Analysis. To begin with, the record on appeal is incomplete. A presentence
report was prepared in this case. See R. 107:2 (Defense counsel: "Mr. Dunn needs a
few minutes to read the presentence report/7) In fact, the prosecutor submitted the
sentencing issue based on the presentence report: "I think the report done by the
AP&P agent, Mr. Feltenberger, was excellent/' R. 107: 6. Yet no presentence
investigation report appears in the record on appeal. Because Defendant has not
made the presentence report part of the record on appeal, "there is nothing before
this Court to determine whether the trial court's use of that report amounted to an
abuse of discretion.

Absent a record, this Court presumes regularity in the

proceedings below." State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1988); see also State v. Nuttall,
861 P.2d 454,458 n. 12 (Utah App. 1993) (stating review of sentencing issue limited
when presentence report not made part of record on appeal). The court trial here
having ordered a presentence report, and absent any contrary evidence "it must,
therefore be presumed that the court did what the statute pr[e]scribed." State v.
Beck, 584 P.2d 870,872 (Utah 1978) (affirming consecutive sentences despite lack of
record that court considered gravity of offense).
At sentencing there was little explicit discussion of "the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
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rehabilitative needs of the defendant/ 7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004).
These factors were undoubtedly referenced at length in the presentence report. In
addition, clues in the record reveal the court's awareness of each factor.
The gravity of the offense was, of course, discussed at length over the nine
months from plea to sentence: Defendant stole $1.3 million from the victim in a
string of 11 fraudulent acts. Similarly, the number of victims is indisputable: one.
Defendant's character was on display throughout the various hearings held by the
court in an effort to accommodate Defendant's failure to perform on the plea
bargain.

Over a series of months he attempted to evade responsibility for the

failure of the plea bargain, insisting to the end that "I haven't done anything wrong
yet." R. 107: 8. The court expressed its assessment of Defendant's character when,
without contradiction from counsel, it hyperbolically declared that Defendant "has
lied from the day he was born up until now." R. 106: 7-8. Only Defendant's
rehabilitative needs were not touched upon in one hearing or another. They were
presumably addressed in the presentence report. Because the PSI was not included
in the record on appeal, this Court will assume the regularity of the proceedings
below, i.e., that the trial court reviewed the PSI and acted in light of the information
it contained.
The actual sentence imposed on Defendant was carefully calibrated. The court
did not simply "impose[] consecutive sentences," Br. Aplt. at 20, but ran the terms
27

on counts 1 through 3 consecutive to the terms on counts 4 through 7, and the terms
on counts 8 through 11 consecutive to the other counts. R. 107:11; R. 88. Thus, as
noted above, the court in effect ran three terms consecutively and the remaining
eight terms concurrently to those three.
Given the deference due to sentencing courts on appeal, the presumption in
favor of regularity where the appellant has failed to complete the record on appeal,
and indications in the record that the trial court considered the relevant sentencing
factors, this Court should conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing this measured sentence upon Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted May 14, 2009.
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN
380 E 4TH AVE #A
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84103
DOB: 01/19/1968

INFORMATION
Case No.

OKjCCO^

judge /T^Akms
OTN#:

Defendant.

The undersigned Tony C. Baird, Deputy Cache County Attorney, under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant, in Cache County, State of Utah, committed
the following crime(s):
COUNT 1:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 5/18/2004, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 2:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:

That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/16/2004, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 3:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/16/2004, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services wras or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 4:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/16/2004, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 5:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/16/2004, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 6:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/26/2004, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.

COUNT 7:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 1/20/2005, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property wras stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 8:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 1/21/2005, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 9:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 7/23/2005, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services wras or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 10:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 8/8/2005, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services wras or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.
COUNT 11:
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-405, as follows:
That LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN on or about 1/6/2006, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another by deception,
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and the
(i) value of the property or services was or exceeded $5,000;
(iv) property was stolen from the person of another.

This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witness(es):
MIKE PETERSON, SLCPD
Authorized this January 10, 2007 for presentment arfd filing:
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Tony C. Baird
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THE COURT:

Let's take the case of State of Utah

versus Larry Douglas Dunn.
pretrial conference.

This is the time set for a

Mr. Perry, obviously your negotiations

have been successful.

Will you verbalize for me your

arrangement, please.
MR. PERRY:
agreement.

Your Honor, we prepared a written plea

In that agreement it sets forth all of the terms.

The court has the copy.

What basically Mr. Dunn is going to

plead guilty to is the 11 counts.

He's going to waive his

right to a preliminary hearing and plead guilty to the 11
counts.

The state will then release him on his own

recognizance.

We'll waive our right to be sentenced within

90 days, or within 45 days.

And we'll set sentencing in 90

days .
During that 90 day time frame Mr. Dunn, if he has a
passport, will turn it over to me or his probation or parole
officer.

He agrees to deposit $1.3 million in my trust

account.

And this money will be paid to the victim Richard

Waters to compensate him for the monies Mr. Waters previously
transferred to Mr. Dunn during the years of 2004 and 2005.
And they are the monies subject to the 11 counts in the
present case.
The state agrees that upon entering the guilty pleas to
the 11 counts they will stipulate to his own recognizance for
a period of 90 days.

The state further agrees that once it
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has verified that Mr. Waters has received the 1.3 million in
legal funds, it will stipulate to the defendant withdrawing
his pleas to the 11 counts and the present case will be
dismissed.
They've also agreed that if he has any problems with -he had a parole date last week.
based upon this agreement.

The Board should release him

The state has also agreed to

write a letter to the Board recommending that he be released
for this time period so he can get these monies together.
THE COURT:

So it's anticipated that with this

agreement he will be released from the Utah State Prison?
MR. BAIRD:

Yeah.

We'll ask the court to make sure

that there's an OR release in this case, his own recognizance
release.
THE COURT:

What is he in prison for now?

MR. BAIRD:

A bad check, I think, a bad check

THE COURT:

Out of which court?

MR. BAIRD:

Salt Lake.

MR. PERRY:

Third District.

THE COURT:

Mr. Dunn, you understand and realize

offense.

that if the court approves this thing here today and I
release you on your own recognizance on this case, I don't
have any control over whatever that other case is down at the
prison?
3

THE DEFENDANT:

Absolutely.

I'm still on parole

until 2027.
THE COURT:

But you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

The state is comfortable that he will be

released and can follow through on this arrangement that has
been made.
Vr.

Dunn, you've been incarcerated, but have you consumed

any alcohol or drugs before coming in here today?
THE DEFENDANT:

Not drugs, but I take medications.

And they're nonpsychotropic.
THE COURT:

Those medications that you are taking oo

not affect your ability to make a reasoned decision right
now; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

They don't.

Do you feel you've had ample opportunity

to discuss this matter with your attorney, Mr. Perry?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Very much so.

Do you feel that you understand what is

going on nere today?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Very well, yes.

Has anyone promised you or threatened

you with anything to get you to plead guilty to these 11
counts other than as set forth in this document or
represented to the court by your attorney?
4

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No, sir.

You understand that any recommendation

made to me as to what sentence you should receive would be a
recommendation only and I may or may not accept the
recommendation, do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:

After I've done X, Y and Z you still

would have the authority to not dismiss the case?
THE COURT:

That's correct.

I'm inclined to do

that, but you need t o understand that these are all
recommendations, eve ryth ing that has been said.

I can see no

reason at this point in time -- I understand that this is a
result of much negotiati on, et cetera, that has gone on and
the court in all pro babi lity would follow through on that.
But you need to understand that I have the last word and if I
get additional information I may do something different.

You

understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Ver y well.

Has the defendant waived his

preliminary hearing?
MR. PERRY:

No, Your Honor.

MR. BAIRD:

No.

THE COURT:

You understand that this statement of

He needs to do that.

1

defendant sets forth the rights you have as relates to a
preliminary hearing?
THE DEFENDANT:

Yes.
5

THE COURT:

And the purpose of a preliminary hearing

is to ascertain whether or not the state can show that
there1s probable cause to believe that the offenses you were
charged with were committed and you were the person who
committed those.

This sets forth those rights.

By signing

this document you give up your right to that preliminary
hearing, you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:
signature.

Yes, sir.

This document does appear to bear your

You signed this before it was submitted to me; is

that correct?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Immediately, right now.

Very well.

The counts that I understand

you will be pleading guilty to are all second degree
felonies.

They appear to all be theft by deception.

read count one.

If 11

Theft by deception, a second degree felony,

in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-405.

The

information alleges that the defendant did, on or about May
18th, 2004, obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the
property of another by deception with the purpose to deprive
the owner thereof.

The value of the property or services was

or exceeded $5000.

Or the property was stolen from the

person of another.
Count two is exactly the same as the first, except the
date there is July 16th, 2004.

Count three is the same as
6

count two, including the date.
five is the same.

As is count four and count

Count six is the same as those pre viously

described except the date there is July 26th, 2004.
seven is also the same, theft by deception.
is January 20th of 2005.

Count

The date there

Count eight is the same as

previously set forth, except the date is January 21st , 2005.
Count nine is the same, except the date is January -- excuse
me, July 23rd, 2005.

Count ten is theft by deception as

previously described, with the date being August 8th, 2005.
And count 11 is, again, theft by deception, the same as
previously described, except the date is January 6th, 2006.
To those 11 counts, Mr. Dunn, how do you plead?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Can I make a suggestion?

What's the date on the first one?

The date on the first one is May 18th,

2004.
THE DEFENDANT:
guilty —
ones.

You might want to have me pi ead

you said the first one, have me just do the second

I was incarcerated then.

I was incarcerated at that time.

Itfs just a matter o f dates.
I'm pleading guilty to all

of them, but -MR. BAIRD:

It's on or about.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I still plead guilty.

All right.

To those 11 counts how do
7

1

you plead?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE COURT:

4

Guilty.

Mr. Baird, give us the factual basis for

the 11 counts.

5

MR. BAIRD:

On the dates -- on or about the dates

6

alleged m

7

County, state of Utah, Mr. Richard Waters transferred monies

8

from here to accounts under the control of Mr. Dunn.

9

one of these transfers was in excess of $5,000.

10

the information, from a source here in Cache

Each

Mr. Waters, if called to testify, would testify that

11

these monies were transferred for a specific purpose.

12

that these monies were received by Mr. Dunn and Mr. Dunn

13

acknowledged that he received these amounts.

14

And

That subsequently, some several months later, Mr. Waters

15

demanded that the defendant give the monies back and the

16

defendant has not returned those funds.

17

present evidence that these funds were used inconsistently --

18

inconsistent to the purpose that they were given to Mr. Dunn

19

for.

20

funds.

21

that we would prove.

22

The state would

Thus Mr. Dunn exercised unauthorized control over the
Along with the other elements, those are the facts

THE COURT:

When you indicate to us, Mr. Baird, that

23

the money was used for other purposes than what was

24

originally designated by Mr. Waters, apparently that was for

25

the purpose of depriving Mr. Waters of the benefit of that

money; is that correct?
MR. BAIRD:

1

Is that what you're maintaining?

When the money was used inconsistent for

^
the purpose for which Mr. Waters gave it to Mr. Dunn, and
then subsequently not returning the money, refusing to return
it, it shows an intent to permanently deprive -- there were
several demands made.

Mr. Dunn may not agree with all of

these facts, but this is the evidence we would present, that
the money was given to him for, among other things, a
business venture and some other things.

But in any event the

monies -- the state would present evidence, bank records, to
show that the monies were used inconsistent for the purpose
for which it was given to him.
THE COURT:

And that Mr. Waters was deprived of the

MR. BAIRD:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Mr. Dunn, you've heard the facts as

money?
He's never received the money

back.

related to us by Mr. Baird.

Are you pleading guilty because

you committed the offenses as he described them?
MR. PERRY:

I don't think he would agree to that.

Maybe we might have to do it on an Alford basis.
pleading guilty to get out of jail.

He's

The reason he couldn't

get the money back once the demand was made was his probation
officer -- his probation got violated down in Salt Lake
County and he got incarcerated so he wasn't able to access
9

the money.
MR. BAIRD:

We would agree to an Alford type plea.

I understand Mr. Dunn may not agree with all of the
representations that the state has made.
the evidence we would present.

Nonetheless, that's

We would present bank records

and whatnot to show that the money was used inconsistently.
I think Mr. Dunn realizes that there! s some give and take
here.

He un derstands that this is in his best interest to do

this, to mak e this arrangement.

So I think for purposes of

resolving it and looking at the li>:elihoc>d of conviction and
weighing all those sorts of things, I think that he believes
that this is in his best interest.
our conversa tions.

At least I think so from

Is that right, Mr. Dunn, you believe this

is in your b est interest?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Mr. Dunn, the court can!t accept a

guilty plea to something unless sonlebody committed the
offense and you're telling me you d idnf t commit the offense.
But there's an exception to that an d that exception is what
we call an Alford type plea.

That is where, after

consultation with your attorney, you have determined that it
is in your b est interest to accept the pi ea bargain that the
state has pr oposed because you thin k if y ou went to trial
your chances of being convicted are such that you're better
off to take this plea.

Is that wha t you ! re telling me here
10

in this case?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Very well.

The court will accept the

plea, designating it as an Alford type plea.

But I need to

assure you that in doing that, if you don't follow through on
this arrangement and it becomes necessary for this court to
pass sentence, you are sentenced the same as if you admitted
you performed the acts.

The court will accept it as a guilty

plea, you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Very well.

The court will accept and

designate it as an Alford type plea.

I will sign the order

containing the statement of defendant and incorporate that
into the record.

Pursuant to your agreement, the court will

authorize the defendant's release on his own recognizance
pursuant to the terms and conditions in the statement of
defendant.
Counsel, how are we going to review this?

How do you

want to handle that?
MR. PERRY:

Set it for a sentencing date in 90 days,

THE COURT:

Set it for sentencing, is that what you

I guess.

want to do?

I guess there's no need for a PSI in this case.

Who is going to report back to the court if he's performed
all of the obligations?
11

MR. BAIRD:

We will.

I guess, frankly, what we

probably ought to do, because otherwise he'll have to be
referred to AP&P for a statement and that sort of thing.

I

would suggest that we set it for a status hearing 90 days
out, 90 days from this coming Monday.

And then at that time

we 1 11 know whether everything has been fulfilled.

If not, I

guess set it for sentencing.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Can I ask a question?

Ask your attorney and he can bring it to

my attention.
(Pause in the proceedings.)
MR. PERRY:

His question was if he has the money

sooner than 90 days can we come back before the court and
have this dismissed.

My answer was ITm sure the state

wouldn't oppose a dismissal if the money is returned.
THE COURT:
every Monday.

Mr. Dunn, we handle routine matters

If you get this thing taken care of before

that, notify your attorney.

Mr. Perry knows how to put it on

the next Monday's calendar.
All right.
ten.

We'll schedule it for the 20th of August at

The court will designate that as a status conference.

I'll expect the parties to come prepared at that time to
represent to me whether or not -- in as much as we don't have
AP&P or someone monitoring it, the attorneys will have to be
prepared to come and tell me what the status of the case is
12

that day.
All right.

Have we covered all of the bases?

MR. PERRY:

I did say this earlier on the record,

but, Mr. Dunn, are you willing to waive your right to be
sentenced within 45 days?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I appreciate that Mr. Perry.

Anything

else that we should take care of?
MR. PERRY:

Nothing that I have.

THE COURT:

Mr. Baird, have we covered everything in

this matter?
MR. BAIRD:

I believe so, yes.

THE COURT:

Very well.

THE BAILIFF:

Court is in recess.

(Hearing concluded.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped hearing was
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for
the State of Utah.
That a full, true and correct transcription of the
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the
pages numbered 2 to 13, inclusive.
I further certify that the original transcript was
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache
County, Logan, Utah.
Dated this 5th day of September, 2008.

C^^
Roaney MV Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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Addendum C

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

071100069

LARRY P. DUNN.
Judge: Clint S. Judkins
Defendant.

I, Larry D. Dunn, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and
that I understand the following facts and rights:

Waiver of Preliminary Hearing
I understand that I am waiving my right to a preliminary hearing. A preliminary
hearing is a procedure to determine probable cause and to inform an accused of the
charges against him or her. Competent evidence which shows probable cause that the
charged crime was committed and that the defendant committed it is sufficient to hold an
accused to answer. The evidence does not have to be sufficient for a conviction at trial.
I understand that at a preliminary hearing, an accused has the right to be
represented by counsel. If an accused cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to
represent him or her.
I understand, that an accused may call and compel witnesses to testify on his or her
behalf, and confront and cross examine any witnesses the State may call to testify. I
understand that an accused may testify on his or her behalf, or remain silent and say
nothing. In order to proceed with my plea today, I waive my preliminary hearing.

ENT'D MAY 1 4 2007

Notification of Charges
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes:

Crime & Statutory Provision
A.

Degree

Theft by Deception (Eleven Counts) 2nd Felony

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
1 -15 yrs Prison
$10,000 Fine + 85% surcharge

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the ciimes(s) to which I
am pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty7 (or no contest) will are
as stated in the criminal information filed in this case. See Information on file in this
case.
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute
or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons
for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my
guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crimes(s) to which I am
pleading guilty ( or no contest): The facts are those stated by the prosecutor in open court
during the plea hearing.

Waiver of Constitutional Rights

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all die following rights:

Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I
understand that I might alter, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay
for the appointed lawyer's service to me.

I have not wraived my right to counsel. I am represented by David Perry.
I certify that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and
elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also
understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty (or
no contest) plea(s).
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).

Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest).

Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have
the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.

Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance
and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear,
the State would pay those costs.

Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against
myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could
not hold my refusal to testify against me.

Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of
the charged crimes(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not
guilty," and my case will be set for a trial At a trial, the State would have the burden of
proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a
jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me
guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.

Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford
the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).

I know and understand that by pleading guilty or no contest, I am waiving
and giving up all the statutory and constitutional right as explained above.

~ >/

Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea

Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine,
or both.

I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part
of a plea agreement.

Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one
crime involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they
may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine
for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting
sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead
guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive
sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty
occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive
sentences would be inappropriate.

Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a
plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and

provisions of the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including
those explained below:
A. I agree to plead guilty to the eleven counts of Theft by Deception as charged in
the Information in the present case, each a second degree felony.
B. If not already in the possession of my probation/parole officer, I agree to turn
my passport(s) over to my attorney, David Perry, until this case is concluded. I further
agree not leave the State of Utah without first obtaining written approval from my
probation/parole officer and the State's attorney in this case.
C. I agree to deposit $1,300,000.00 (U.S. dollars) into the trust account of my
defense attorney, David Perry, within 90 days of entering the guilty pleas in this case and
being released from the Utah State Prison. This money will be paid to Richard Waters to
compensate Mm for the monies Mr. Waters previously transferred to me during the years
of 2004 and 2005 (as outlined in the State's discovery). These monies are the subject of
the eleven counts in the present case.
D. The State agrees that upon me entering guilty pleas to the eleven counts
discussed above, it will stipulate to an own recognisance release for a period of 90 days.
^ W w ,
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E. The State farther agrees that once it has reasonably verified that Mr. Waters has
received the $1,300,000.00 in legal funds, it will stipulate to me withdrawing my pleas to
the eleven counts and the present case will be dismissed.

Trial Judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what
they believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge.

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest).
No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to me.

I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any
changes because all of the statements are correct.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.

I am JX Years of age. I have attended school through the

''/

grade. I can

read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter
has been provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or
intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am net
presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my
judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any
mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I
am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I
must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I

understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty (or no contest). I will
only be allowed to withdraw my plea if 1 show that it was not knowingly and
voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in title 78,
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Dated this

II
/

Dayof
Day of.

M/H

,arry D. Dunn
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Certificate of Defense Attorney

I certify that I am the attorney for

, the defendant

above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I
have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understand the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and
belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly state; and these, along with the
other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit,
are accurate and true.

ATTORNEY FORz£>EFENDANT
David Perry
Bar No.:

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
, defendant. I have reviewed this
Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct
which constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or
coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully
contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the
record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would
support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered
and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Tony C. Baird
Bar No.:

Order

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court
witnesses the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.

It IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.

Dated this

Day of.

\M*~1
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ORIGINAL

THE COURT:

State versus Lari"y Douglas Dunn.

This

is the time set for sentencing on 11 counts of theft by
deception, all second degree felonies.

Any reason why

sentence should not be passed at this time?
MR. PERRY:

Your Honor, we ! d like to make a motion

to continue sentencing.

Mr. Dunn has a hearing on the 23rd

and he indicates that he may be releas ed from prison a couple
of weeks after that.
The whole premise of this case was that he would --

once

he's released from prison without someone monitoring him, as
far as restricting his phone call acce ss, he'd be able to
make arrangements to come up with the restitution.

If he

came up with the restitution, then the state was willing to
allow him to withdraw his plea.
Since the time he's entered his pi ea he finally got
paroled into Day Reporting Center and also had some surgery.
Then my understanding is now he's back in prison.
this hearing set on the 23rd of Januar y, 8:00.

And he has

He just needs

some more time, if the court is willin g to grant him another
60 days.

He can then come up with the money and the case can

be resolved.
THE COURT:
ludicrous.

You know, counsel , that'3 almost

Based on his representations in the past and his

actions, now you want additional time.

I'll hear from Mr.

Brown on that.
2

MR. BROWN:

My input on that is -- I represent

Richard Waters and h e's here, Your Honor.

The amount

of

restitution is $1.3 million, which is quite a bit of money.
My understan ding is that Mr. Dunn could basically give
someone powe r of attorney to get the money.

We don't want to

continue the case, but we're willing to continue the case if
he's willing to give a power of attorney to his lawyer to get
the money.

Since he 's at the prison, I would take the -- for

Mr. Perry to be appointed as attorney m
instructions as to h ow to get the money.
problem with that.

fact with
I don't have any

]Mr. Waters just wants his money b a c k .

THE COURT:

Do you h ave any hope at all of getting

any of that 1cased on what this man has done so far?
MR. BROWN:

Well, I know he has the money.

to him as to whether or not h e'll give it back.

It's up

With the

amount of money that he took and the amount of time that he
has -- I don 't think he could spend that amount of money yet.
I don't have any problem with —
back.

not just him getting it

If he 1 s willing to giv e power of attorney and have

that occur within 60 days, we don't have a proolem with that.
I do understand he's remainin g m

counsel.

prison.

THE COURT:

Mr. Bair d, input from the state.

MR. BAIRD:

I don't share the same optimism as

I don't th.ink Mr. Dunn is ever going to come up

with this money.

I don't think he's going to do what it
3

takes.

If m

fact he does have it. I don't think he'll do

what it takes to come up with it.

We've given him ample

time, more time than we originally agreed to give.

I'd like

to see Mr. Waters receive restitution, but I'm just not
optimistic that he'll ever see that.
As far as continuing it, I think we've belabored the
issue.

But if they have some sort of hope that they're going

to see some money, I'd like to err on the side of helping
them.

I just don't think that Mr. Dunn is going to do what

he needs to do to get it.
THE COURT:

Well, I'll tell you what we'll do.

continue the matter to the 11th of February.
9:00 for sentencing.

I'll

That will be at

Mr. Dunn, I can assure you that this

court will do everything it can to see that you serve out the
balance of your life in prison base d on what you've done in
the past.

So if you don't want to do that, if you don't want

to serve the rest of your life in p>rison -- you've got 11
counts, all second degree felonies, which carries one to 15.
I'll make those consecutive.

If you don't want to serve out

the balance of your life in prison, then you better come up
with that money by the 11th.
THE DEFENDANT:

I can't, sir.

never messed up with your not once.

The deal was --I've

I though" actually that

you were quite amenable and understanding.

The prosecutor

needed to bust my balls and be the tough guy and I understand
4

that.

But you clearly —

knew what it entailed.

the deal was signed by you and you
I asked for 60 days to cover the 34

days to access the money, so that would give me three weeks
of the dominoes not falling properly.

I was given another 30

days beyond that by the prosecutor just because he felt like
he wanted to make sure it happened.
that was 100 percent.

So far the deal was --

I've never been given one day.

Moreover, I was sent to prison for not doing a new crime,
but for the alleged possibility of this crime here, which
I -- Mr. Baird even admitted when we pled saying Mr. Dunn has
come up with an idea here and we can get this resolved.

He's

given us the opportunity to hang him, but at the same time he
also gets to prove he's innocent.
Moreover, when that money is deposited into my attorney's
account then all the other monies I will have access to the
account.

Then I asked for the possibility of going back and

filing charges against Mr. Waters for having this happen to
me because it should not have happened to me.

That's why I

gave you the guys the opportunity to hang me if I didn't come
through, but I haven't had one day.

You're frustrated with

me, saying you've given me ample time.

No.

I've never

once -- there's not been any intercourse betwixt me or the
prison.

I haven't received one letter -- I'm not sure this

is true, but I bet Mr. Baird hasn't gone to my attorney and
said I haven't heard from Junior, what's going on.

Maybe he
5

did, I'm not sure, but my attorney would have let me know
there was concern.

Nothing has happened.

Then my father gets involved and oh, gee.
released -- done everything.

I ve already

I gave you the guys the

opportunity to hang me so I can show my innocence at the same
time.

But I've not been given one day, sir, not even one

hour outside of prison.
THE COURT:

Mr. Dunn, are you telling me» you want to

proceed with sentencing today?
THE DEFENDANT:

I don't know what to do.

I thought

you were actually -- remember when you said, Junior, I can
still sentence you after you raise the money and I said I
understand that.

I don't have to go with the state's

recommendation you said.

But you said if you do pay the

money it was likely that you would go ahead with that and let
the state withdraw the charges.

I thought you ac tually were

being very helpful.
Now you're saying I have been given all this time and I
haven't done anything.

I've just been sitting in prison

waiting for this to happen.

There's things that my attorney

didn't share with you that happened with the 3oar d.

When

they finally found out in mid October that I wasn 't
sentenced, or released yet, Ms. Cheryl, and I don ' t know but
I think it's Ms. Cheryl Atkins, said, what, this deal hasn't
been done yet.

If I can find two board members I '11 have it
6

done today.
Then my dad gets involved and I'm sent to a halfway house
where I'm monitored.
live on my own.

I have a clotting problem, but I can

I'm a grown man.

THE COURT:

Mr. Perry, after all of that tirade, I'm

not sure if your client wants to be sentenced today or would
like to take the deal to the 11th.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

The 11th doesn't matter.

We might as well proceed today then, I

suppose.
THE DEFENDANT:
effect.
weeks.
days.

I said I need 34 days for the domino

What I'd like to have is a safety net of three
I asked for 60 days.

Then Mr. Baird said give him 90

But I need at least 34 days with no problems

whatsoever on the domino effect.
MR. BAIRD:

Your Honor, the state is convinced that

Mr. Dunn is not going to do what he agreed to do.
wasting our time to continue it to the 11th.
to do it.

We're

He's not going

Now, I understand that the victim would like to

get his money, but this man isn't going to do what he needs
to do to get the money, if it even exists at all.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Then why did you sign on the deal --

That's enough.

It appears to the court

that we're grasping at straws to get all or part of that
$1.3 million and it's not coming, Mr. Brown.

This guy has
7

1

lied from the day he was born up until now.

2

spiel here today too.

3

MR. BROWN:

You've heard his

I've heard his spiel over and over, a

4

lot more than anybody in this room.

5

power of attorney to Mr. Perry, that's the simple question

6

I'd like him to answer today.

7

THE DEFENDANT:

If he's willing to give

I've already said yes.

And the

8

deputy -- supposedly, when we had our pow wow last time, went

9

and verified that the account cannot be accessed without
So I'm taking my own

10

myself and Richard there in person.

11

funds and putting them in over here so that Richard gets his

12

and then I'm expecting him to go over and release those

13

still.

14

crime, but on the alleged of this now for two years.

15

say I'm causing problems.

16

So I feel I've been in prison not for doing a new

THE COURT:

How am I causing problems?

Let's give him the benefit of the doubt

17

and continue it to the 11th at nine.

18

money in --

19
20

TKE DEFENDANT:

I can't.

If you can get some

I told you what I needed,

34 days.

21

MR. BROWN:

Continue it to the 11th, Judge?

22

THE COURT:

The 11th, 3:00.

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24
25

And you

(Hearing concluded.)

Why?
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THE COURT:
Dunn.

Let's take State versus Larry Douglas

Mr. Perry, I show that this is the time set for

sentencing on 11 counts, all theft by deception, all second
degree felonies.

Any reason why sentence should not be

passed at this time?
MR. PERRY:

Your Honor, I think this is a case that

we ought to maybe have Mr. Dunn examined to see if he's
competent to proceed.

I'll file the petition and ask the

court to stay sentencing until the state can look at him and
see if he understood what he was doing when he entered his
plea or not.
THE DEFENDANT:
vigorously defend me?

Can I ask for an attorney that would
I deserve that whether I'm guilty or

not.
THE COURT:

Mr. Baird, input from the state on Mr.

Perry's motion?
MR. BAIRD:

May we approach?

THE COURT:

Come forward.

(Sidebar, not recorded.)
THE COURT:

The court has had an opportunity to

visit with counsel at the bench,

Mr. Perry, anything

further?
MR. PERRY:
presentence report.

Mr. Dunn needs a few minutes to read the
I haven't talked to him since he was

here last.
2

THE COURT:

You've had ample opportunity to visit

It's time to proceed.

with him.

MR. PERRY:

I make a motion to withdraw his guilty

pleas that he entered.

THE COURT:
writing.

The motion will need to be ma de in

You can dc that at a later time.

MR. PERRY:

We object to proceeding with sentencing

at this time because in order for him to -- once h e's
sentenced he' s not able to withdraw his plea.

So we'd

like

to make a motion prior to sentencing to see if the plea can
be withdrawn.

I want to supplement that by having him

examined by two examiners at the state hospital to see if he
was competent. at the time he entered his plea.

THE COURT:

Mr. Baird, the court has hear d your

comments at the bene h, but I'll hear what you have to say on
the record.

MR. BAIRD:

We oppose that.

with sentencing toda y.

We'd like to go ahead

If counsel wants to file a motion at

a later time, we'll respond to it then.

THE COURT:

Anything further, Mr. Perry?

MR. PERRY:

We object to proceeding with sentencing

today because we ' ve made -- we want to make a petition to
determine whe ther he ! s competent to proceed.

Once we make

that petition , Your Honor, as you well know that s tays all
proceedings.

So we can't proceed with anything further until
3

that issue is resolved, unless you want to have a hearing to
see whether the petition is valid.

That still stays all

proceedings.
I make that petition at this time in behalf of Mr. Dunn
to stay all proceedings so that we can determine whether he
was competent at the time he entered his plea and whether his
plea should be withdrawn or not.
THE COURT:

Mr. Perry, this matter has been pending

for ITm not sure how long.
are untimely.

The court finds that your motions

I'll allow you to file those in writing if you

so desire, but the court will proceed with sentencing today.
Anything else you'd like to place on the record?
MR. PERRY:

Mr. Dunn entered into an agreement where

he was hopeful that he could get out of prison and get over
to the Isle Mann where he's indicated he has the one point
three million dollars to pay Mr. Waters.
get out of prison and get access

He was unable to

to these funds in order to

pay the restitution to Mr. Waters.
Because he's been unable to get out of prison to get
access to this money, he has not had the benefit of the
bargain that was entered into in this case.

That being that

once he paid the 1.3 million the state would stipulate to him
being able to withdraw his plea and the charges be dismissed.
Because of his inability to have access to this money that's
in the Isle Mann, an off shore trust, because of his
4

incarceration status, he's been unable to make restitution.
Had he been able to make restitution we wouldn't be
proceeding with sentencing today and the charges would be
dismissed.
Mr. Dunn is confident that he has that money there.
believes the money is there.
access

He

He just needs to be able to

the money and then Mr. Waters can be made whole.

sentencing him to prison it will delay that.
will -- he may be in prison a long time.

By

And plus it

He pled straight up

to the charges with the understanding that he thought he
would be able to get out of prison and get the money.

The

state wrote a letter and tried to help him in that matter.
Because of different factors he's been unable to -- he
was released to a halfway house, but they would not allow him
telephone access or any type of pass to be able to
this money.

Therefore he's still in prison.

access

I believe he

has a Board date, or maybe not.
THE DEFENDANT:
MR. PERRY:

I went to the Board.

You went to the Board and don't have a

date?
THE DEFENDANT:

The Board said I needed to figure

out this second thing, which I haven't got to talk to you
about yet.

Then go back and tell them what happened.

They're pending right now posing you a question, but I
haven't even spoken to my attorney.
5

THE COURT:

Anything further?

MR. PERRY:

Anything you want to say to the Judge?

This is the time for sentencing, Mr. Dunn.
THE COURT:

Mr. Baird, input from the state?

MR. BAIRD:

I think the report done by the AP&P

agent, Mr. Feltenberger, was excellent.

I thought he did a

great job of explaining what Mr. Dunn is all about.

Mr. Dunn

is a complete fraud and he continues to try to -- even today
it's continually a fraud.

He's unlike many defendants, or

any defendant, frankly, I've ever prosecuted.

I think Mr.

Feltenberger's recommendation is very appropriate.
court to sentence the defendant to prison.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I ask the

I'll submit it.

Can I say something, Your Honor?

Go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT:

I came up with this idea.

I asked

originally for a pow wow to all get together so the
prosecution could see that Richard was all on board and
understanding.

The prosecution saw that.

to Richard, what he said.

Mr. Baird listened

Everything that I W e said is

exactly one line linear after the next.
I said that this deal had to be done before May 8th.
prison did not transport me on -- was it the 5th?

The

The Friday

beforehand I had court here and for no reason at all the
prison didn't transport me.

Your assistant sent it in, maybe

this lady here sent it in, but I wasn't transported.
6

The deal needed to be done before May 8th is what the
Board said and then I would be released on May 8th last year.
It wasn't done before May 8th.

I came actually on Friday, a

week after -- four days after I was to be released.
lost that May 8th Board date.

So now I

I even said to you on that

date, and it's on the video or the transcript, I said I could
be another three to six months before I get released.
I come back and meet with you and I was still cheery.

I

said to you I've seen the Board, they told me I'd be released
July 31st, but it's now August 20th.

Clearly something is

arrears.
I went back and my captain, Hughes, who doesn't like
inmates, threatened me saying if I'm not telling the truth
I'd go to max.

He took me at my word and called the Board.

The Board lost my file.

They said that they misplaced it.

They misplaced it during the summer time, whatever happened.
They said we'll get right on it.

It wasn't done.

I finally

wrote to Deputy Warden Bouseo and asked for his help.
contacted Officer Valdez, our caseworker.

And I

They called the

Board and a Ms. Cheryl, and I don't know if that's Ms. Cheryl
Hansen or not, but a Ms. Cheryl said, oh, my gosh, and I
heard, it was on the speaker phone, this deal isn't done yet.
If I can find a Board member it will be done by this
afternoon.

And the next day I had my Board date for the

13th.
7

1

Now, the next mess up -- I haven't done anything wrong

2

yet.

3

never get to perform.

4

have another angiogram.

5

Mr. Baird, but I got emails in my pocket that these gentlemen

6

brought up, that my dad sent around saying junior needs to be

7

watched, make sure he's taking his blood, everything for the

8

angiogram.

9

Everybody keeps saying I'm such a bad person, but I
My dad gets involved because I had to
I don't know if he get involved with

I got sent to a halfway house which I never asked to go.

10

The Board actually, when I went to them, they didn't know I'd

11

went to the halfway house.

12

there.

13

like still being in prison, but you can get your own food and

14

stuff like that.

15
16
17
18

They said why did you ask to go

I didn't ask to go there.

THE COURT:

At a halfway house it's

Mr. Dunn, I have other matters that need

to be taken care of.
THE DEFENDANT:

But you need to knowing everything

was mixed up.

19

THE COURT:

Make your comments relevant to --

20

THE DEFENDANT:

These are relevant.

These are

21

exactnesses.

Now I get to the halfway house and they say I

22

can't come to court unless I receive a fax from you in the

23

morning time.

24

faxed something down.

25

now have a $20,000 bail.

I called every morning that morning and they
My boss brings me up and I see you.
I come back.

I don't run away.

I

They had seven men run away from the halfway house.
If I go to prison ri ght now

I'm trying to resolve this.
Mr. Waters won't get his money.

I've been m

prison right

now not because I've done another crime or something, but
because of this.
His attorney, Mr. Brown, this is very important, these
are exacts, went to my agent.

They called the judge and said

I'm a bad person, let's send him to prison on this st uff
right here.

So I've served two years on something I should

never have aone in the beginning.

Richard and I shou Id have

sat down and got it worked out instead of him going to my
parole agent.

Now I'm here facing 11 felony twos.

I gave

you the opportunity to hang me if I didn't perform, but

I've

never performed.
Moreover, the court attorney, I haven't even seen this -what is this called? -- tne PSI.
yet.

I haven't even seen the PSI

But PSI agent at the hearing -- the attorney at the

hearing, Manny Garcia, said this isn't even acceptabl e to the
court because Mr. Feltenberger lied to the Board and
misrepresented stuff that we've already aefended before the
Board and that they threw out.
admissible m

So this actually isn' t even

your court upon some law that they said •

THE COURT:

Mr. Dunn, you have another 30 seconds.

Finish it up.
THE DEFENDANT:

So you want to resolve this and I
9

want to resolve this.

I thought in the beginning when I met

you you signed on this as being a good deal.
saying I'm such a bad guy.

Everybody keeps

When do I get to perform?

I've

been incarcerated now for two years on something I didn't do,
this right here.

An Alford plea where I say I'm not guilty,

but the other guy says I am, so we figure out a way to
resolve it.

If you want to resolve it -- I don't need

anybody to determine if I'm crazy.
plan here.

I invented this little

So why are you sentencing me —

to take it out of

the Board's hands and sentencing me to probation for the same
90 days when I'm released from prison?
THE COURT:
up.

Very well.

Mr. Dunn, your 30 seconds is

Anything further, Mr. Perry?
MR. PERRY:

I just wonder if the court would

continue this for like an hour setting to hear all of the
facts?
THE COURT:

No, counsel.

on and talking about fairy tales.

This thing has gone on and
All of his life he's been

able to dupe people into things like this.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Name one thing where I've messed up.

That's enough, Mr. Dunn.

isn't going to be provoked any further.
motions to file, file them.
the past and you didn't.

This court

Counsel, if you have

You could have filed those in

Mr. Dunn has all of these big

stories that he'd like everybody to believe.

He's done that
10

all his life.

This court won't be manipulated further.

Waters isn!t going to get his money.
dangle that as a carrot.

Mr.

He keeps trying to

If he had any money that he wanted

to give Mr. Waters he could have done that in the past.

We

tried that and it didn't work.
Anything further?
MR. PERRY:

Ask the court to at least run them

concurrent.
THE COURT:

It will be ordered that the defendant on

the 11 counts serve not less than one nor more than 15 years
in the Utah State Penitentiary.
fine in the amount of $1500.

On each count he's to pay a

Pay restitution in the amount

of $1,149,175, plus interest.
The court will run counts one through three
consecutively.

Counts four through seven consecutively and

counts eight through 11 consecutively.

Very well.

That will

be the order of the court.
(Hearing concluded.)
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 071100069 FS

LARRY DOUGLAS DUNN,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

CLINT S. JUDKINS
February 25, 2 00 8

PRESENT
Clerk:
lindac
Prosecutor: BAIRD, TONY C
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PERRY, DAVID M
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 19, 1968
Video
CHARGES
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
10 , THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Di sposition: 0 5/11/07
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Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

Case No: 071100069
Date :
Feb 25, 2008
11. THEFT BY DECEPTION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/11/07 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
Page 2
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Date:
Feb 25, 2008
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT BY DECEPTION a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the CACHE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Charges 1 through 3 will run consecutive to charges 4 through 7,
and charges 8 through 11 will run consecutive to those charges.
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Case No: 071100069
Date:
Feb 25, 2008
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine :
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 3

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 4

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charqe # 5

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 6

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 7

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Charge # 8

Fine
Suspended
Surcharge
Due

$1500.00
$0.00
$702.70
$1500.00

Fine:

$1500.00

Charge

# 9
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Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $702.70
Due: $1500.00
Charge # 10

Fine: $1500.00
Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $702 .70
Due: $1500.00

Charge # 11

Fine: $1500.00
Suspended: $0.00
Surcharge: $702.70
Due: $1500.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due
Restitution
Dated this yj^day

$16500
$0
$7729.7
$16500
Plus Interest
Amount: $1149175.00 Plus Interest
of

V"g^>

j^^\^!]nO^
CLINT S. JWDKINS
Srf&i&gSi''^ District Cofkrt Judge
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